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Thucydides is an important author for any discussion of the possibilities 
for an ancient Greek democratic peace. Though democratic peace did not, 
in fact, seem to function in classical Greece, a number of passages in 
Thucydides show that an affinity did exist among democratic factions and 
city-states in the context of hostile competition between democratic and 
oligarchic regimes. Thucydides remarked on this competition and was 
aware of the inter-democratic affinities, but did not seem to think them 
salient in city-state decisions of war and peace. The failure of democratic 
peace to develop may relate to the environment of the Greek city-state, 
which privileged local interests over broader constitutional ideals. 
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 Democratic peace – the hypothesis that democracies never, or very rarely, go 
to war with one another – could not be more relevant to international affairs than they 
seem to be at present. An obvious sign of this is the increasing stridency with which 
the President of the United States has pushed the notion that liberal governments 
bring peace, and that American security and freedom depends upon spreading 
democracy around the world. While critics might note that President Bush’s policies 
seem to feature going to war to achieve this peace, it is nevertheless significant that 
the President frequently voices the expectation that more democracies will result in a 
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safer, more peaceful world. The ongoing, difficult democratization efforts in occupied 
Iraq surely provide some of the impetus behind this increasingly insistent rhetoric, but 
the idea first appears prominently in the White House’s National Security Strategy 
statement of 2002.1 It then recurs in many subsequent presidential speeches, including 
the State of the Union address of 2004, and most dramatically in the Inaugural 
Address of 2005, in which the President made the expansion of liberty and the ending 
of tyrannies everywhere America’s primary mission in the world – indeed, he labeled 
it the ‘calling of our time.’ Similar statements have abounded in the year since. At 
President Bush’s press conference of January 26, 2005, for example, he stated that 
‘Free societies are peaceful societies’ and ‘…Freedom is necessary in order to 
promote peace.’ It seems that the ideology of democratic peace — at least one version 
of it — has found a vocal supporter in the current White House.2  
 But skepticism about the likely success of President Bush’s policy and the 
very notion of democratic peace as he would apply it is not hard to find,3 and drives 
one to ask how well-founded in history the supposed phenomenon might be. How far 
back can one demonstrate the existence of democratic peace? A few years ago I 
published an article in the Journal for Peace Research (Robinson, 2001a) challenging 
the arguments by a few scholars who allege that democratic peace operated not only 
in the modern world but in classical Greece as well, which would add quite an 
impressive pedigree. I was moved to write the article because my research on classical 
Greek democracy suggested to me that significant problems would face anyone 
claiming that it operated in antiquity. The case for a modern democratic peace (also 
called liberal peace) seemed rather strong empirically, in contrast with that for any 
ancient Greek version.4 Thus my article went about trying to address the claims for 
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the ancient version. The point was not to say that democratic peace as a general theory 
was wrong, but merely that it did not seem to apply to the ancient world. 
 The present paper will revisit this issue and attempt to discover why 
democratic peace did not function by focusing on Thucydides, the subject of this 
special issue and the PRIO conference from which it stems. Thucydides is a central 
author in the argument about a Greek democratic peace, and it will be illuminating to 
probe a little farther than did my earlier article into his understanding of and reports 
about wars, alliances, and popular governments in his time. (I will not attempt, as 
does Russett in this issue, a more generalized look at factors potentially inhibiting an 
ancient democratic peace.) One finds a curious tension in Thucydides when trying to 
apply the notion of democratic peace to his writing: on the one hand, as the spiritual 
father of the realist school of international affairs,5 his outlook does not readily 
accommodate the retrojection of the rather idealist notion of democratic peace; on the 
other hand, evidence in his history can indeed be found for a cooperative relationship 
of some kind between democratic factions and polities. Sorting out how and why this 
cooperative relationship existed without democratic peace itself emerging is the goal 
of this paper. 
 
THE ABSENCE OF AN ANCIENT DEMOCRATIC PEACE 
 
 To summarize briefly the argument made in my previous article, it started by 
contending that the ancient world is an entirely appropriate era to investigate with 
regard to the issue given the striking similarity of democratic ideals ancient and 
modern. In both eras the same two principles, freedom and equality, are touted as the 
supreme principles of a democratic state. For example, democracies ancient and 
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modern place great value on collective freedom from domination by an oppressive 
ruler or ruling class, individual freedom to live as one wishes, and equal treatment of 
citizens before the law. Of course, the manner of implementation of these ideals and 
the social contexts in which they flourish vary dramatically (as they must any time 
one compares political arrangements in distant historical eras). As we will see later in 
this paper, the variation in context — especially the Greek city-state (polis) setting — 
may offer a possible explanation for the main conclusion of my earlier study, which 
was that democratic peace does not seem to have obtained in classical Greece. 
Contrary to what investigators Bruce Russett & William Antholis (1992, 1993) and 
Spencer Weart (1998) had hoped to show, the evidence from the period in and around 
the Peloponnesian War indicates that not only did ancient democracies go to war with 
each other, they did so with a fair frequency. Both quantitative and traditional literary 
analyses supported this conclusion. The most famous and perhaps most telling case 
was that of the Athenian expedition to Sicily in 415 BC, a campaign on which 
Thucydides lavishes a great deal of attention in his history. Here we find one 
democracy, Athens, launching an unprovoked assault on another, Syracuse, with 
control of Greek Sicily hanging in the balance. Weart’s attempt to deny the label 
democracy (Greek demokratia) to Syracuse fails to convince, coming across as a 
desperate ploy to save his notion that wars never occurred among ancient democratic 
states. I also advanced several other cases not raised by other investigators of wars 
among democratic states in the fifth century BC, further undermining the case for an 
ancient democratic peace and contributing to my conclusion that insufficient evidence 
exists to argue credibly for the phenomenon in the ancient world.6  
 
THUCYDIDES AND DEMOCRATIC AFFINITIES 
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 Nevertheless, one must admit that there are some intriguing statements in the 
ancient sources that indicate the formation of a special relationship between Greek 
democracies (and democratic factions) of the fifth and fourth centuries BC. Russett & 
Antholis (1992, 1993) point out some of these passages in their studies, and there are 
several others one should bring into the discussion as well. Thucydides, as it turns out, 
authored many of them. In fact, his history reveals much about the connections that 
existed between ancient democracies. 
 Relatively early in his history Thucydides makes a fundamental claim about 
the relationship between the Peloponnesian War and the competition between 
democrats and oligarchs taking place in city-states (poleis) throughout Greece. After 
having described the initial stages of a bloody civil war in Corcyra between democrats 
favoring alliance with Athens and oligarchs preferring ties with Corinth and Sparta, 
he states (3.82.1):  
 
…[The revolution] seemed the more savage, because it was among 
the first that occurred; for afterwards practically the whole Hellenic 
world was convulsed, since in each state the leaders of the 
democratic faction (hoi tōn demōn prostatai) were at variance with 
the oligarchs (hoi oligoi), the former seeking to bring in the 
Athenians, the latter the Spartans. And while in time of peace they 
would have had no pretext for asking their intervention, nor any 
inclination to do so, yet now that these two states were at war, either 
faction in the various cities, if it desired a revolution, found it easy to 
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bring in allies also, for the distress at one stroke of its opponents and 
the strengthening of its own cause. 
 
And, a little later in the same section, 3.82.8: 
 
The cause of all these evils was the desire to rule which greed and 
ambition inspire, and also, springing from them, that ardor which 
belongs to men who once have become engaged in factious rivalry. 
For those who emerged as party leaders in the several cities, by 
assuming on either side a fair-sounding name, the one using as its 
catch-word ‘political equality for the masses’ (plēthous isonomias 
politikēs) the other ‘prudent aristocracy’ (aristokratias sōphronos) 
while they pretended to be devoted to the common weal, in reality 
made it their prize.7 
 
Thucydides in this section has been describing the traumatic civil strife at Corcyra 
with more horrified passion and greater detail than he devotes to any other such 
conflict covered in his history; clearly, he intends the account to stand as a searing 
example of the nature of this kind of struggle, one that he states (here and elsewhere) 
was cropping up all across Greece during the course of the long Peloponnesian War. 
For our purposes, we must note the assertion that, in general, democratic factions 
sought to bring in Athenian aid, and oligarchic ones Spartan aid. This assertion fits 
well with claims made in various classical authors that Athens tended to support 
democracies and Sparta oligarchies,8 and establishes a clear affinity between 
democratic Athens and factions fighting for democratic government in their own 
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states. But two wrinkles must also be noted: Thucydides emphasizes the effect of the 
larger war between Athens and Sparta in triggering this sort of partisan conflict and 
competitive intervention by greater powers: without it, leaders would not have the 
excuse (or even the desire?) to call for aid. He also stresses the small-minded motives 
of the various factional leaders, however grand their slogans may sound. We will 
return to these points later. 
 Another potentially revealing passage in Thucydides comes as he describes the 
debate in Athens over what to do with the surrendered population of Mytilene after 
the violent rebellion of that state from the Athenian alliance. In course of a speech 
pleading for leniency, the Athenian speaker Diodotus claims that ‘At the present time 
the common people (dēmos) of all the cities is well disposed to you, and either does 
not join with the aristocrats (oligoi) in revolting, or, if forced to do so, is hostile from 
the beginning to those who stirred up the revolt….’ (3.47.2) Now, as pointed out in 
Robinson 2001a, one cannot take this statement at face value: unlike the previous 
quotations, which produce Thucydides’ own words as commentator on events, this 
one comes as part of a speech he attributes to one participant in a heated debate in the 
Athenian assembly, who obviously puts a self-serving spin on events. Nevertheless, 
his comment still constitutes evidence that contemporary Athenians might have 
believed, or could have been persuaded, that the class of people (the dēmos) most 
supportive of democracy in cities within their imperial alliance preferred to side with 
democratic Athens rather than aristocratic factions within their own states.  
 But perhaps most telling of all is the sequence of events Thucydides describes 
in the fifth book of his history as he narrates the formation of a new military alliance 
in the Peloponnese designed to rival that of Sparta. After Sparta agreed to peace with 
Athens in 421 BC, angering a number of Sparta’s allies, one of them (Corinth) 
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initiated diplomatic efforts to build a new Peloponnesian alliance around Sparta’s 
longtime adversary Argos, which had been neutral in the war with Athens. The story 
of the negotiations, diplomatic maneuvering, and, ultimately, warfare that followed 
this initiative is spelled out in great detail by Thucydides, and we need not work 
through it all. The aspect to note here is one rarely emphasized: the importance of 
constitutional type – particularly democracy – in shaping events. Argos, a 
thoroughgoing democracy in this period,9 eagerly embraced Corinth’s initiative in 
order to feed its hegemonic ambitions. But right from the start the Corinthian 
ambassadors who hatched the idea were worried about letting the Argive people 
(dēmos) do the negotiating with potential allies, and so insisted that it empower a 
select committee to handle matters (5.28.1). Aside from the desire to keep things more 
secret via the committee (which Thucydides specifies as the reason offered by the 
Corinthians, 5.27.2), Corinth, an oligarchy, may have also hoped that by keeping the 
masses of ordinary Argives out of the negotiation process it could mitigate the 
democratic profile of its new alliance. If so, it was to be disappointed. The first state 
to join up was Mantinea, and among the reasons Thucydides gives for their decision 
was that the Argives were ‘democratically governed like themselves.’ (5.29.1) Elis, 
almost certainly a democracy at this time,10 also joined (5.31.1). Other states wavered, 
including Boeotia and Megara. Why did they hesitate? According to Thucydides 
(5.31.6), it was because of the Argive democracy, which the oligarchic Boeotians and 
Megarians worried would suit them less well than the conservative order of their 
present allies, the Spartans. Eventually, for various reasons, oligarchic Corinth itself 
would abandon, and democratic Athens join, the alliance, underscoring its democratic 
character. Argos welcomed the Athenians, in part, Thucydides tells us, because of 
their common democratic system of government (5.44). In the end, Argos’ 
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Peloponnesian power play suffered defeat at the battle of Mantinea in 418 – which 
was immediately followed by Sparta’s fomenting of the oligarchic coup at Argos. The 
resulting non-democratic government failed to last, but the attempt itself further 
illustrates the degree to which Argos’ democracy was seen by its foes as driving its 
foreign policy. And indeed, when demokratia reasserted itself at Argos within a few 
months, the state joined again in alliance with democratic Athens and pursued an anti-
Spartan policy.  
 This sequence of events, combined with the other Thucydidean passages 
singled out here (and a few more not noted above),11 is revealing. Clearly, a rivalry 
existed between oligarchic and democratic governments at this time. Aristocratic 
leaders of conservative constitutional orders distrusted democratic states. Democratic 
decision-makers paid attention as well, more readily joining other democratic states in 
alliance. And outside powers of either variety did not hesitate to capitalize on 
preexisting internal divisions within a given state to foment a democratic or oligarchic 
revolution in that state consonant with the constitutional alignment of the outside 
power. The polarization is striking, and would seem to provide a good foundation for 
ancient democratic peace.  
However, as already discussed, such a peace never materialized. Democracies 
found themselves fighting each other now and again, as, for example, Argos did in the 
years following its alliance with Athens when it sent troops to support the Athenian 
expedition against democratic Syracuse. Any cooperation among democracies is 
subordinated, it would seem, to more pressing goals. Indeed, it must be emphasized 
that Thucydides himself never raises populist fellow-feeling as a spur to war or peace 
in this era, despite the democratic/oligarchic polarization in Greece upon which he 
occasionally comments. His narration of the events in book 5, with all the diplomatic 
 10 
and strategic maneuvering leading up to the new coalition around Argos, stresses the 
same kinds of motives and factors that he highlights elsewhere in his history as 
leading to clashes: fear of loss of prestige and power (Sparta’s great concern, should 
its Peloponnesian league be eclipsed by an Argive one [5.30; see also 1.23, 88]); the 
need to gain advantage before the coming of an inevitable war (5.28, 44; also 1.44) 
hegemonic ambition (5.28; also 1.67-8, 6.1); territorial disputes with neighbors (5.29, 
31, 41; also 1.39); past wrongs and services (5.31, 44; also 1.25-6, 32, 40). The 
democratic connections I have highlighted take some noticing: Thucydides never 
himself draws attention to the democratic profile of the alliance that emerges. 
For the sake of comparison, let us briefly consider another ancient author, 
Xenophon, whose history of Greece picks up where Thucydides’ war account ends 
and then continues to cover Greek events for a few decades after the end of the 
Peloponnesian War. While it is apparent from Xenophon’s descriptions that the 
polarization of democratic and oligarchic states continued and remained a factor in 
fueling a number of wars and revolutions of the early fourth century, he too prefers to 
stress other factors in explaining why fighting broke out or persisted, to include the 
desire for state freedom and autonomy, the chances of winning or losing, past injuries, 
past loyalty or services, or Greek unity in opposing non-Greeks.12 Often, he is 
surprisingly vague about governmental change or constitutional factors in describing 
the outcomes of wars when one state conquers another.13 Given that he certainly was 
aware of the continuing democratic/oligarchic polarization, it is worth noting that he, 
like Thucydides, seemed to think it less important a factor for bringing about war or 
peace than other motivating forces.  
 The conclusion that one should draw from all this ancient testimony is that 
contemporary Greek observers certainly understood that tensions between competing 
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democratic and oligarchic models of polis governance frequently spilled over into the 
realm of war, civil strife, and alliance-making in the fifth and fourth centuries. 
Nevertheless, the observers did not recognize anything like a true democratic peace 
ever taking hold (and, as my previous article showed, none ever did). States of a given 
political alignment might keep in mind how they could use factional allegiances to 
their advantage when competing with rival states, of course. Indeed, one could almost 
speak of ‘democratic war’ — that is, wars democracies waged purposely targeting 
oligarchies (and ‘oligarchic war’ when the reverse happens) — as democracies and 
democratic factions not infrequently cooperated in conflicts against oligarchies and 
oligarchic factions and vice versa. Leaders of populist factions would attempt to 
capitalize on this habit so as to gain allies for their internal struggles. Thus, even 
though the ancient authors rarely highlighted it, a degree of fellow-feeling or at least 
consciousness of convergent interests must have existed between democratic states 
and factions. Why, then, did no observable democratic peace emerge?  
 
AFFINITIES WITHOUT PEACE: AN EXPLANATION 
 
 First of all, one must acknowledge the role of the democratic-oligarchic 
dynamic itself. Whatever cooperation between democracies existed did not exist in 
isolation: it went hand-in-hand with a comparable affinity between oligarchies in 
circumstances of violent competition between the two, competition that itself formed 
part of the larger conflict between great powers (Athens and Sparta primarily, but at 
times with the participation of Thebes and Argos). Thus any explanation for why 
there was no democratic peace to match the observed ‘democratic war’ should not, 
ideally, rely entirely on theories about the internal practices of democracy. The 
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consideration, for example, of the factors most often discussed in explaining the 
appearance of democratic peace in other eras — the institutional restraints and 
cultural norms of democracies, shared experiences of democratic leaders, etc. — can 
only offer a partial answer.14  
A key aspect of ancient democratic behavior that may help us toward an 
explanation comes out of Thucydides’ history — or rather, it is something that, 
strikingly, does not come out. One would search in vain in Thucydides for evidence of 
a conviction among Greek democrats that democracy should be promoted for its own 
sake. That is, one detects no sense of mission in ancient democracies that we read of 
in Thucydides (or in other ancient texts) to spread the gospel, as it were, so more 
Greeks could enjoy the benefits that the democratically governed felt themselves.15 Its 
absence is particularly striking in Thucydides’ report of Pericles’ funeral oration, 
probably the most famous encomium to a democratic government from all of 
antiquity: Pericles heaps praise on Athens for (among other things) its constitution, 
claiming that it was a more a model (paradeigma) for others than it was copied from 
others (2.37.1), but nowhere suggests that Athens had — or should have — striven to 
promote it abroad. Nor does any hint of such a sentiment appear elsewhere in 
Thucydides’ history or others’. The contrast with the modern world, or at least the 
modern United States, is striking. For decades now, it has been taken as a given that 
the U.S. seeks to promote democracy around the world (even if inconsistently, or at 
the point of a gun) as a basic tenet in its foreign policy. The recent broadcasting of 
this mission by the Bush administration in prominent speeches and policy statements 
only highlights a longstanding U.S. goal shared by both major political parties.16  
The absence of a comparable messianic drive among ancient Greek democrats 
signals, one may suppose, a different conception of constitutional ideals and their 
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importance within the polis setting. Just as no democratic city-state, however happy it 
may have been with its form of government, felt the need to promote the idea abroad 
for the sake of the idea, so no democratic city-state would automatically sympathize 
with — to the extent of avoiding hostilities with — a fellow democracy simply 
because of its democracy. Perhaps the Greeks believed that constitutional types had 
little to do with a citizen body’s fundamental character, and it is the character of a 
people (combined with polis self-interest) to which Thucydidean speeches for or 
against war constantly appeal.17 After all, Greek city-state governments of all 
constitutional stripes were far smaller and far more directly connected to the people 
themselves than modern states with all their governmental apparatus.18 Thus the major 
factors we hear of for going to war in Thucydides (such as land disputes or past 
injuries or hegemonic ambitions) seemed far more immediate and illustrative of a 
neighboring population’s threat or worth than the manner of internal procedures it 
may have used to decide to act the way it did. To be sure, the decision-makers of 
states of one constitutional type seem to have found it easier to work with or trust 
those in a similar political milieu when considering alliances: democratic politicians 
or indeed the ruling dēmos itself in a democracy would have no qualms about 
conducting business with their equivalent in another democracy, whereas (the book 5 
evidence from Thucydides seems to show) there was a deficit of such ready trust on 
the part of oligarchic leaders in making deals with popularly ruled city-states. But a 
systemic affinity among democratic actors, lacking any larger dedication to the ideal 
of democracy across Greece, could not trump the more immediate imperatives 
(potential threat, past injury, polis character, sworn alliances, etc.) that led the small, 
locally oriented Greek communities to make war on one another.19  
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The absence of devotion to abstract constitutional principle — or perhaps, 
more precisely, the inability of any such attachment to overcome the intensely local 
perspective of the Greek polis — would help explain how it is that, in Thucydides’ 
accounts, internal democratic/oligarchic struggles can have such a prominent place in 
the prosecution of wars and yet get so little explicit play in discussions of causes. 
Recall in the passages from book 3 noted earlier in this paper how Thucydides 
qualifies the importance of factional struggles in the Corcyrean civil war: it took the 
existence of the larger war between Athens and Sparta to spark these vicious internal 
conflicts in the first place; and even once they broke out, the alleged agendas of the 
participants (democracy or oligarchy, expressed via whatever specious slogans they 
might use) mattered little, for the truth was that winning personal power in their local 
community motivated them, not allegiance to higher constitutional ideals.  
A lesser degree of attachment to political causes beyond the arena of the polis 
would also explain how it was that interstate democratic connections — which clearly 
did exist — were ignored so often when faced with the prospect of war. Perhaps the 
most dramatic illustration is the episode leading most directly to the Peloponnesian 
War itself: the conflict between Epidamnus, Corcyra, and Corinth, described by 
Thucydides in book 1. The troubles began when the dēmos of Epidamnus, hard-
pressed by recently exiled aristocrats (hoi dunatoi), made an appeal for help to its 
mother-city, democratic Corcyra. Corcyra refused to help, preferring to side with the 
aristocrats. The desperate Epidamnians next turned not to some other democracy, but 
to oligarchic Corinth, which like Corcyra was tied by kinship to Epidamnus as a 
(secondary) mother-city. The Corinthians, with a longstanding grudge against their 
former dependents the Corcyreans, agreed to help the Epidamnian dēmos, the 
Corinthians’ oligarchic system apparently offering no impediment. Finally, 
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democratic Corcyra then went to war against the dēmos of Epidamnus. Throughout 
this buildup to open international conflict, we find the appeal across state lines of 
shared constitutional ideals utterly trumped by the more vivid feelings of polis anger 
at past wrongs, desire for territorial control, and ties of kinship. These, of course, are 
the kinds of factors that Thucydides highlights as motivators not just in this account 
but throughout his history. 
The hypothesis that democratic peace failed in Greece because of a different 
Greek valuation of constitutional ideals, one that inhibited attachment to 
constitutional causes beyond one’s own polis, makes good sense of the testimony in 
Thucydides (and other, less rich sources from antiquity). But further factors may also 
have played a role in preventing the emergence of an ancient democratic peace, such 
the differing political institutions of ancient and modern democracy. These will be 
considered in Russett’s article later in this issue.20 
 
Author’s note: I wish to thank the participants in the PRIO conference at Columbia 
University and the anonymous readers for JME for their comments on earlier versions 
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